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SHEPPARD V. MAXWELL REVISITED—
DO THE TRADITIONAL RULES WORK
FOR NONTRADITIONAL MEDIA?
GARY A. HENGSTLER*
In the late summer of 1954, all across northern Ohio—indeed, throughout
much of the nation as a whole—people pondered this question: Did Dr. Sam
Sheppard kill his pregnant wife Marilyn in their Bay Village home on Lake
Erie, just west of Cleveland?
Certainly my mother thought so. Whether ironing, cooking, sewing, or just
biting her lip with her ear next to the radio, she was only one of many in the
western-Ohio town of Wapakoneta, fifty-three years ago, seemingly transfixed
by each day’s new shocking developments in the investigation. I was a mere lad
of seven, but the scenes of my family, our neighbors, and the community in
general discussing and debating Dr. Sam’s guilt or innocence remain deeply
etched in my memory, surpassed only by the first criminal trial of O.J. Simpson.
One thing the Sheppard case had in common with the Simpson case was the
notion, held by many segments of the public in 1954, that the media were
making too big a deal out of the case—pandering to the more sensational
aspects of journalistic endeavors. Much of the criticism of the press subsided,
though, when Dr. Sam was convicted. But the entertainment side of the media
certainly knew a good story when it saw one, and while the case worked its way
through the appeals process, the TV series entitled “The Fugitive” began its
four-year run in 1963.
Then, in 1966, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the “massive, pervasive
and prejudicial publicity” attending Dr. Sam’s prosecution prevented him from
receiving a fair trial consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.1 Thanks to successful arguments by F. Lee Bailey, Dr. Sam would
be tried again on remand and this time would be acquitted.
By the time the Supreme Court granted certiorari for Dr. Sheppard, it had
already begun wrestling with some of the inherent tensions between the First
and Sixth Amendments.2 But Sheppard became the critical precedent when it
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1. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 335, 349–63 (1966).
2. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (holding that actual prejudice was not required to
reverse the petitioner’s conviction due to the high probability of a circus atmosphere denying him due
process); Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (two-thirds of jurors had formed a belief about
petitioner’s guilt before testimony was given).
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held that responsibility for safeguarding the fundamental fairness and integrity
of the trial rests solely with the judge. The Court even stressed that
a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial
administration, especially in the criminal field. . . . The press does not simply publish
information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the
police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
This Court has, therefore, been unwilling to place any direct limitations on the
freedom traditionally exercised by the news media for “what transpires in the court
3
room is public property.”

In short, media have no legal responsibility for the fairness of any criminal trial.
Instead, the Court in Sheppard not only took great pains to detail the
pervasiveness and sensationalist nature of the coverage of the case, but also
took the judge to task for failing to counter or blunt the impact of the publicity,
specifically enumerating steps the Court believed could have been taken:
Bearing in mind the massive pretrial publicity, the judge should have adopted stricter
rules governing the use of the courtroom by newsmen, as Sheppard’s counsel
requested. The number of reporters in the courtroom itself could have been limited at
the first sign that their presence would disrupt the trial. They certainly should not have
been placed inside the bar. Furthermore, the judge should have more closely regulated
the conduct of newsmen in the courtroom. For instance, the judge belatedly asked
them not to handle and photograph trial exhibits lying on the counsel table during
4
recesses.

In addition, the Court felt the judge should have insulated the witnesses;
controlled the release of leads, information, and gossip to the press by police
officers, witnesses, and counsel; proscribed extrajudicial statements by any
lawyer, witness, party, or court official divulging prejudicial matters; and
requested the appropriate city and county officials to regulate the release of
information by their employees.5
This decision, in effect, has become the guidepost for judges today to deal
with the media in high-profile cases—from protective orders (known as “gag
orders” to the press) prohibiting lawyers, witnesses, and parties to the case from
talking to the press about the case; to changes of venue; to sequestration of
jurors; to continuances to let publicity abate; to press pool arrangements; to
stronger admonitions to jurors to not read newspapers or watch television news
or listen to radio news accounts of the trial. All judges are familiar with these
tools today. Because these alternatives are embodied in a Supreme Court
decision, few question their legal validity in coping with the dynamics of a fair
trial and a free press.
As an aside, however, it is worth noting that almost all the offending
publicity cited by the Court occurred in the investigation stage, before the trial
court had jurisdiction. In fact, the most respected legal journalist of her era, the
late Theo Wilson, in her book, Headline Justice, flatly accused the Court of
deciding Sheppard “based on misleading information provided to the justices by
3. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 350 (quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947)).
4. Id. at 358.
5. Id. at 359–62.
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F. Lee Bailey.”6 She and other journalists sent a letter to the Supreme Court
trying to correct the record about how the decorum of the trial had been
handled. Telling the Court that the descriptions it included in the opinion were
of things that occurred at the coroner’s inquest and not at the trial, Ms. Wilson
wrote,
[W]e tried to be tactful for we knew we would have to work at the new trial in
Cleveland. We would have to deal with Lee Bailey, who had won his appeal with
allegations about the courtroom behavior which we knew had never occurred and
7
which, of course, he never saw.

But this article does not attempt to reargue Sheppard and its directives for
today’s judges. Rather, a more fundamental—and critical—question has arisen
for today’s courts: Are the suggestions the Court enunciated in Sheppard fortyfive years ago still effective, given the changes that have occurred in the media?
When the U.S. Supreme Court developed the tools for judges, newspapers
were the predominant source of news, although the nightly television newscasts
were rapidly narrowing the gap. Moreover, the bulk of the news media were
mainstream—local newspapers, regional television stations—the overwhelming
majority of which sent journalists with reasonably ethical values to cover the
courts. Supermarket tabloids sensationalized some trials, but their real impact
on public perception of the courts was marginal at best. In other words,
journalists and court personnel, for the most part, were able to create a working
environment wherein both could do their jobs with minimal interference with
the other. Journalists tended to respect boundaries because they knew any
short-term gain by disrupting the status quo to get a story today could have
long-term negative effects with sources down the road.
No more.
Technology has changed the playing field in every aspect of life, and the
judicial system is not immune to those changes. The Internet has left journalism
professionals almost in disbelief at the losses suffered—in terms of both
economics and influence. Newspaper publishers are keenly aware of how much
revenue has been lost in classified ads, at one time a cash cow for local papers.
Now Internet sites offer wider reach, faster turnaround, and lower cost.8
With the advent of cable television, the networks’ power and influence
became diffused. Nothing illustrates the decline in television news better than
the survey of today’s youth as to where they get their national news. Over
twenty percent of those between the ages of eighteen and twenty-nine listed

6. THEO WILSON, HEADLINE JUSTICE: INSIDE THE COURTROOM—THE COUNTRY’S MOST
CONTROVERSIAL TRIALS 74 (1996).
7. Id. at 76.
8. Alan Jacobson, The Growing Crisis: Unprofitable Online Sites May Cost Newspapers Their
Classified Franchises, INSIDE CLASSIFIED, April 2002, available at http://www.brasstacksdesign.com/
franchise.htm.
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their chief source of news as Jon Stewart on Comedy Central’s The Daily
Show.9
That technology is affecting the status quo of courts and media cannot be
denied. It takes many forms. For example,
This week, the United States became a more dangerous place for women. Many
newspapers and TV stations across the country are splashing the face and the name of
the accuser in the Duke Lacrosse case across their front pages, on their Web sites and
on our TV screens. The move departs from a common media policy of not revealing
the name of accusers in rape cases, a shield observed since the 1970s. The Internet is
10
driving the push, with its looser standards on identifying accusers.

The advent of “citizen journalists,” or bloggers, raises a wide range of issues for
the courts. Are these bloggers journalists? Do state shield laws include them? In
United States v. I. Lewis Libby, U.S. District Judge Reggie B. Walton included
bloggers among those granted media credentials for covering the trial.11
Mainstream journalists tend to be guided by generally accepted ethical
codes, such as those promulgated by the Society of Professional Journalists or
the Radio–Television News Directors Association. However, because the First
Amendment effectively prohibits any governmental licensing of journalists,
such ethical codes must be strictly voluntary. In short, the only discipline that
can arise from a violation of an ethical norm is that of the marketplace. The
reporter or editor could be fired by his or her employer—which happened to
Jayson Blair at The New York Times, for example.12
The pressure of the marketplace has tended to create other, less extreme
boundaries for journalists. For example, mainstream media tended not to name
rape victims, in part out of a sense that anonymity was the moral thing to do,
but also because any newspaper or TV station that named such a victim would
soon feel the wrath of the readers or viewers.
That constraint does not bind those on the World Wide Web. Some blogger
on the Internet is generally credited with revealing the name of the woman who
accused Kobe Bryant of rape in Eagle, Colorado. In that small town, the
mainstream reporters fairly quickly knew the name but followed tradition in not
revealing her identity. Thus, because standards have tended to become looser as
the Internet has grown as an information source, it should not have been a
surprise when mainstream journalists like Robert Novak “outed” CIA agent
Valerie Plame.

9. Young America’s News Source: Jon Stewart, CNN.com, Mar. 2, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/
SHOWBIZ/TV/03/02/apontv.stewarts.stature.ap/http://www.cnn.com/2004/SHOWBIZ/TV/03/02/apont
v.stewarts.stature.ap/.
10. Myron Pitts, Naming Rape Victim a Dangerous Precedent, FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER, April
15, 2007 available at http://www.fayobserver.com/article?id=259809.
11. United States v. I. Lewis Libby, No. 05-394 (RBW) (D.D.C. Jan. 10, 2007); see also Robert
Cox, Judge’s Order Lays Out Groundrules for Blogger Coverage of Libbby [sic] Trial, MEDIA
BLOGGERS ASS’N., Jan. 17, 2007, http://www.mediabloggers.org/robert-cox/judges-order-lays-outgroundrules-for-blogger-coverage-of-libbby-trial.
12. Byron Calame, Preventing a Second Jayson Blair, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2006, at 12.
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Because of increasing reliance on the Internet for news, print and electronic
media are converging in an effort to stem financial losses and adjust to the new
realities of how people get news. Newspaper Web sites include blogs and
streaming video. Television sites include much more detail than can be
compressed into the news half-hour. Some communities see collaborative
efforts between their local newspaper and a local television station.
The plain truth is that the days of Walter Cronkite are over. Whereas news
was the loss leader for television, it now must show a profit as well.13 In keeping
the public informed, public service has given way to profit margins.
Newspapers, too, are in flux. The sale of the esteemed Knight-Ridder was
triggered in part because the profit margin had slipped to sixteen percent in
2005, down from nineteen percent in 2004.14
All of this would matter little to the courts if it were simply a change in who
is covering trials and reporting on court activities. For most judges and court
administrators, the concern is accuracy—whether the reporter is print,
electronic, or some blend of the two. But the quest for ever-increasing profits
has brought in a new—and in many ways unwelcome—dynamic for the courts.
The entertainment side of the media also has discovered a rich vein to be mined
in the courts. Consequently, “in the 1970s and ‘80s . . . the barrier between news
and entertainment [was] increasingly eroded. Not all the changes of th[o]se
years have been for the worse. But taken together, they raise serious questions
about the future of journalism in an entertainment-dominated medium.” 15
The shift to entertainment is omnipresent. The shrillness of Nancy Grace on
CNN, the attacks on judges by Fox’s Bill O’Reilly, the proliferation of radio
talk shows that focus on politics, the law, or both, are all just examples of
market-driven journalism. Defense Attorney Mark Geragos, who represented
Scott Peterson, told the 2005 Reynolds Center National Conference (the
Conference) that “People Magazine found that when they put a picture of Laci
or Scott on the cover, they would sell 300,000 to 500,000 additional copies. CNN
and Fox found that when they covered that case, their ratings spiked.”16 CBS
legal analyst Andrew Cohen added that he was directed to “put Laci’s name”
on his Internet commentary because it would guarantee more hits from those
who daily ran a Google search of Laci Peterson.17 Clearly, the focus is on
corporate bottom-line mentality. Media lawyer Mark Curriden said at the
Conference, “Just in the last three months, The New York Times, Wall Street

13. Daniel Hallin, Whatever Happened to the News?, MEDIA & VALUES, Spring 1990, available at
http://www.medialit.org/reading_room/article441.html.
14. Steve Lovelady, A Meditation on Disconnects and Dinosaurs, COLUM. JOURNALISM REVIEW,
Mar. 13, 2006, available at http://www.cjr.org/behind_the_news/a_meditation_on_disconnects_an.php?
page=all.
15. Hallin, supra note 13.
16. FROM O.J. TO MARTHA TO MICHAEL: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED ABOUT THE CONDUCT
AND COVERAGE OF TRIALS?: NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COURTS AND THE MEDIA 9 (Jerrianne
Hayslett, ed. 2005).
17. Id.
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Journal, Boston Globe, Dallas Morning News and the Atlanta Journal
Constitution have announced huge cutbacks. Tom Brokaw was on Larry King
talking about ‘you know what, you get fed up. You just don’t have the money to
do the stories that need to be done.’” 18
So if this is the new reality for courts—Internet commentary that may or
may not have any credibility or accuracy and broadcast talk shows that focus
more on entertainment than information—the initial question remains: Do the
tools provided for judges in Sheppard v. Maxwell still work?
The answer is a definite maybe, and then, not always.
For example, often the heavy publicity comes after the crime has been
committed, with police and prosecutors offering information before a court
takes jurisdiction. We see this most egregiously in the form of the police talking
about a “person of interest”—not a suspect yet, but (wink, wink)—someone the
police names to assure the public that they are working diligently. In this
situation, none of the tools work well.
However, assuming the case has reached the court and the publicity is
pervasive enough to cause concern affecting the jury pool, one recommendation
is to continue the case until the publicity subsides. The only problem is that,
once the date is set, virtually all media will have big stories the day before the
trial starts, and these stories will rehash the very same information that
prompted the delay in the first place. That is the nature of the competitive
journalism business, so the effectiveness of that tool is at least questionable.
The same would apply, in most cases, to a change of venue. If the trial is
shifted from Town A to Town B, that often becomes big news for Town B.
Therefore, Town B’s newspaper, TV, or radio station will call their counterparts
in Town A to get all the details for their now-important story. 19
Whether one believes sequestration of the jury is effective depends on how
much one trusts the jurors not to talk to their families during visitation. Still, as
Judge Hiller Zobel told the Conference, being a sequestered juror is, “except
for the brutality and violence, [the same as being] locked into a medium
security prison.”20 Of all the judicial tools, this is the most extreme and least
desired by both the courts and the jury.
Probably the most controversial of the tools is the protective order
preventing lawyers, witnesses, parties, or others tied to the case from
commenting on the case to anyone, especially the press. Even how the tool is
referred to is subject to disagreement—judges opt for “protective orders” while
journalists use the pejorative “gag order.”
Moreover, the federal circuits are split as to what standard is required
before issuing such orders:
18. Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
19. See generally Thomas Beisecker, The Role of Change of Venue in an Electronic Age, 4 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 81 (1995).
20. CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE COURTS AND MEDIA: THE GATHERING STORM: NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON COURTS AND THE MEDIA 47 (Jerrianne Hayslett, ed. 2005).
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As [U.S. District Judge Myron H.] Thompson noted, the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits adhere to the most rigorous standard, demand[ing] a showing of a “clear and
present danger” or “serious and imminent threat” to a fair trial before gagging
participants. The Third and Fifth Circuits employ the “substantial likelihood of
material prejudice” standard[,] while the Fourth and Tenth Circuits hold that gag
orders may be justified by a “reasonable likelihood” of prejudice—a standard that
21
may require an even lesser showing than “substantial likelihood” requires.

One reason such variations in standards annoy journalists is that they are courtimposed content restrictions on speech. Ordinarily, that would require the court
first to determine that less-restrictive means were unavailable under the
circumstances.
The court restrains speech based on what is being said, based on potential harm from
the speech. The speech being curtailed generally concerns the operation of the legal
system; it is speech in the public interest. In short, the critical values and concerns
22
underlying the prior restraint doctrine and the First Amendment are implicated.

Journalists further complain that too often courts impose the gag order without
explaining for the record that the order was necessary to ensure the fairness of
the trial. Lucy Dalglish, Executive Director for the Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press, said journalists are increasingly worried about the
growing use of gag orders in “run of the mill” cases. 23 She said her organization
has experienced a marked increase in calls from concerned reporters
encountering gag orders in both criminal and civil cases.24 Another criticism is
that “gag orders fail to recognize that even parties’ attorneys may often have a
duty to make extrajudicial statements to protect their clients’ best interests.”25
The authors suggest that attorneys whose extrajudicial statements cross the line
could be dealt with through state ethical rules instead of through a gag order.26
Gag orders have always been suspect, at least in the minds of the media. But
even journalism die-hards can point to examples when it looked like lawyers or
parties were trying their cases in the media. The difficulty today is that, because
talk shows on television and radio have discovered the wealth of audience
“draw” to be found in the legal system, the demand for commentary on pending
cases is overwhelming. And with the 24-hour news cycle and the proliferation of
cable shows, “the beast,” as some call it, must be fed. The question thus
becomes: By whom?
Lucy Dalglish told the Conference that the gag orders today simply do not
accomplish what they were designed for.27 In fact, she said, they often help
contribute to the inaccuracies judges complain about in legal-affairs reporting:
21. Kimberley Keyes, Free Speech, Gag Orders, and the Federal Courts, 52 FED. LAWYER 38, 40
(2005) (citations omitted).
22. C. Thomas Dienes, Gagging Trial Participants, 19 COMM. LAWYER 3, 4 (2001).
23. CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE COURTS AND MEDIA, supra note 20, at 36.
24. Id.
25. Michael D. Seplow & Paul L. Hoffman, Punishing Pundits: People v. Dyleski and the Gag
Order as Prior Restraint in High-Profile Cases, 39 LOY. L. REV. 1197, 1200 (2006).
26. Id. at 1221; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Lawyers Have Free Speech Rights, Too: Why Gag
Orders on Trial Participants Are Almost Always Unconstitutional, 17 LOY. L. REV. 311 (1997).
27. CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE COURTS AND MEDIA, supra note 20, at 36.
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“The question becomes: Do you want [reporters] to do the story with good
information or do you want them to find some so-called expert out there?”28 She
also said that putting the so-called expert on to get them to speculate works
against the goals of both the courts and the media. She illustrated her point by
telling how a representative from The Nancy Grace Show asked her to comment
on a case. When Dalglish explained that she did not know anything about the
issue and that the subject was not her expertise, the representative replied, that
would not be a problem—they just needed somebody to comment, and if she
did not come on the show, they would find somebody who would.29 Dalglish
suggested that the public and the courts are better served if the people with the
accurate information—attorneys and witnesses—are allowed to talk to the
press, instead of reporters’ taking any and all who might have an opinion.
Many judges state directly that their only concern is protecting the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. I have encountered several
judges at The National Judicial College with this view, usually stated along the
lines of, “It’s my job to protect the trial, not help the journalists get their story.”
While such sentiments are understandable, it can be argued that the role of the
judge is to protect both constitutional values—the First and the Sixth
Amendments. Even as egregious as the Supreme Court found the facts of
Sheppard v. Maxwell to be, the Court did not find the two amendments to so
conflict as to force a choice for the trial judge. Indeed, just the opposite: the
Court held that both values were critical to our democracy and placed the
burden on the judge to find ways to reconcile the amendments in high-profile
trials.
Granted, it is a thorny area. One scholar suggested one solution might be to
have anonymous defendants in high-profile trials, similar to how civil cases are
handled when the court determines that a plaintiff’s name needs to be shielded
from the public.30 Of course, if the defendant is a celebrity, the scholar
acknowledges anonymity would not work. The suggestion, though, is that a
defendant like Scott Peterson, charged with killing his pregnant wife, Laci,
might have benefited from anonymity. And that might have worked ten or
twenty years ago with the mainstream press. But, as occurred with the woman
who accused Kobe Bryant of rape, the Internet pretty much assures that
somebody will leak the name of the defendant if the coverage of the crime takes
on a life of its own, as it did in the Peterson case.
Another example of the difficulty with trying to shield names in this
information age is use of “Amber Alerts.” When police determine that an
“Amber” is missing and likely the victim of a kidnapping, her name and photo
are placed on TV, on billboards, and any place law-enforcement officials think
might be able to help solve the case. Yet there is an inherent dilemma if the
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Jaime N. Morris, The Anonymous Accused: Protecting Defendants’ Rights in High-Profile
Criminal Cases, 44 B.C. L. REV. 901 (2003).
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facts subsequently determine that Amber was recovered safely but that she was
raped by a child molester during the ordeal. When the molester stands trial, his
name would not be shielded, but Amber’s identity would be—even though
those who followed the case from her disappearance to her abductor’s trial
would know Amber was a rape victim. Mainstream media, by and large, would
refrain from using the name. But so far there is no constitutional way to apply
ethical norms to those who publish on the Internet—thus the inherent flaw in
trying to use the anonymous route.
At the September 2007 conference at Duke University Schoo1 of Law
entitled The Court of Public Opinion: The Practice and Ethics of Trying Cases
in the Media, one panel focused on “The Role and Responsibility of the Court”
in dealing with the media. Apart from me, the panel included David F. Levi,
Dean of the Duke University School of Law; Chief Judge Leroy F. Millette Jr.
of Prince William County, Virginia, who presided over the trials of D.C. sniper
John Muhammad and John Wayne Bobbitt; Chief Judge W. Terry Ruckriegle,
of Breckenridge, Colorado, who presided over hearings in the Kobe Bryant
rape case before the prosecution dismissed the charges; U.S. District Judge
Reggie B. Walton, who presided over the trial of I. Lewis Libby; and David A.
Sellers, Assistant Director for Public Affairs at the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts.31 Chief Judge Millette focused on ways in which the court
can keep the jury from being tainted or otherwise losing its collective
impartiality. Indeed, all three judges acknowledged that, especially in highprofile trials, the voir dire process may involve additional steps or extra work to
examine prospective jurors more closely. Judge Ruckriegle noted that moreextensive and detailed voir dire is burdensome but felt that courts were left with
no alternative if the Sixth Amendment requirements are to be achieved. All,
however, did agree that, despite massive publicity, fair juries can be had
through diligent efforts by counsel and the judge.
All the judges employed orders to spell out to the media what rules were in
place. Judge Ruckriegle termed his a “decorum order.” Judge Walton said his
concern was whether the presence of several reporters would inhibit the candor
of prospective jurors. He resolved this by having the media select one print
journalist and one electronic journalist to be in the courtroom during voir dire,
while the rest observed from a specially created “media room,” where
journalists could observe via closed-circuit television. David Sellers noted the
growing number of courts that use court public-information officers—media
liaisons—as a means of assisting the press and minimizing the need for the trial
judge to deal with media matters.
All on the panel agreed that the ever-changing technology is affecting how
trials are handled—from instances of jurors blogging or checking the Internet
for information, to reporters in the courtroom text-messaging on cell phones to

31. Although there are no published transcripts, the panel discussion was videotaped by C-SPAN.
See DVD: Role of the Court in Media Access (C-SPAN 2007) (on file with author).
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gain a competitive advantage, to the difficulty of dealing with lawyers not
directly under the restraining order themselves, but who comment on behalf of
a client who is a witness and thus so restrained.
Judge Millette noted that many of the concerns about media coverage occur
before the court obtains jurisdiction, thus minimizing the effectiveness of the
tools provided in case law. He said judges could use more guidance on how to
deal with such circumstances, perhaps through bar association efforts. Judge
Ruckriegle, pointing to the Supreme Court cases, suggested that the traditional
tools used to cope with traditional media may need to be considered again in
this age of nontraditional media.
All of this resurrected Judge Learned Hand’s view of the power of the
media. Speaking at a memorial service for Justice Louis Brandeis, Judge Hand
remarked, “The hand that rules the press, the radio, the screen and the farspread magazine, rules the country.”32 And he said it on December 21, 1942—
before television, the Internet, and the other electronic media advances courts
face today.
Certainly with respect to balancing First and Sixth Amendment rights and
values under our system, the answers are not readily apparent. But, as Jonathan
Eric Pahl wrote in his student note included in the Duke conference materials,33
“[T]he various methods courts can use to restrict speech, the uncertainty about
the standards courts will apply to review those restrictions, and the confusion
about the meaning of the standards, . . . provides courts and trial participants
little, if any, guidance.” In essence, Pahl’s analysis is, in his words, a plea for
clarity.34 Forty-plus years after Sheppard v Maxwell, and with the sweeping
changes in the media, that is not an unreasonable request.

32. Adrienne A. Berry, Meet the Press, 46 FED. LAWYER 2 (1999).
33. Jonathan Eric Pahl, Trial Participant Speech, 57 DUKE L.J. 1113, 1127 (2008).
34. Id. at 128.

